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Counter narrative, a story that calls attention to and rebuts the presump-
tions of a dominant narrative framework, functions as an essential tool to
reshape the bounds of the law. It has the potential to shape the collective
notion of what constitutes legal authority. Black Lives Matter offers a
counter narrative that challenges the characterization of the shared public
space, among other aspects of contemporary society, as the space of law.
Using the concept of necropower—the mobilization and prioritization of
the state’s power to kill—I analyze the contested physical and conceptual
space of law exposed by the counter narrative of Black Lives Matter. In
doing so, this article suggests a need for legal doctrines to create space for
otherwise excluded subjects in the framework of constitutional protections,
such as the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. More fundamentally, it identifies the way narrative informs
the parameters of legal authority and legal recognition.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
II. BLACK LIVES MATTER: A COUNTER NARRATIVE
THAT REVEALS NECROPOLITICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
A. NARRATIVE IN AND BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF THE
LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
B. BLACK LIVES MATTER AS COUNTER NARRATIVE . . . . . 1125
III. FRAMING NARRATIVE AND POLICING MYTH:
THE TRIALS OF THE GATEKEEPER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
A. BAYLESS I : COUNTERING MYTH, PRESUMING
INNOCENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
B. BAYLESS II : THE “CHARACTER OF THE
NEIGHBORHOOD” AND THE BANISHMENT OF DICTA . . . 1134
* Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law; Ph.D., Princeton
University; J.D., Yale Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, thanks to
Amy Adler, Barton Beebe, Peter Brooks, Paulina Davis, Ariela Dubler, Seth Endo,
Maryam Jamshidi, Beth Johnston, Ummni Khan, Jessica Lang, Deborah Malamud, Naomi
Mezey, Will Moon, Ann Murphy, Hilary Schor, Shanda Sibley, Julia Simon-Kerr, Scott
Skinner-Thompson, Simon Stern, Naomi Sunshine, Allison Tait, Richard Weisberg, Kenji
Yoshino, and participants in the AALS 2017 Annual Meeting Evidence and Law and the
Humanities Joint Program, the Law, Literature, and Emotion Roundtable at the 2018
Modern Language Association Convention, and the NYU Lawyering Scholarship Collo-
quium. Thanks to Nick Warren for thoughtful research assistance.
1117
1118 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
IV. “DO NOT BE SOOTHED”: THE POET SURVEYS
THE CITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
A. “OUTSIDERS COMING IN” AND THE SPACE OF
EMPATHY IN LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL . . . . . . . . 1140
B. STRIEFF AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
C. INSINUATING THE POET INTO THE CITY LIMITS . . . . . . . . 1146
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
I. INTRODUCTION
A formative civil rights intervention of our day, the Movement forBlack Lives (the Movement),1 counters a prevailing normativeframework in a way that strikes at the heart of the intersection of
law and society. The Movement’s most familiar manifestation, Black
Lives Matter, exposes the complex dynamic of law—on the books, as in-
terpreted doctrinal principles, and as enforced statutes—and society. In
doing so, the Movement challenges the bounds of what ought to be con-
sidered the space of law’s protections and the identity of its subject. In
examining the space of law, I refer to the experience of a subject’s mate-
rial body on the street. A subject may inhabit a space of protections of
rights typically accorded citizens or, alternatively, be positioned in an
area circumscribed by suspicion, and thus be subjected to exceptions de-
termined by racial identity. In addition, I analyze the conceptual bounda-
ries of the law, including the positioning of certain forms of authority and
evidence beyond legal recognition. In doing so, this article examines how
the demarcation of material and conceptual space through law threatens
to restrict the space of protected rights and presumed innocence that le-
gal subjects inhabit.
As a conceptual framework with its own boundaries, narrative offers a
means to challenge the demarcation of norms. Scholarship has con-
1. For the Platform of the Movement for Black Lives, of which the Black Lives Mat-
ter Network is a part, see Platform, THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl
.org/platform [https://perma.cc/XXW4-GVV8] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018); see also Niraj
Chokshi, How #BlackLivesMatter Came to Define a Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/how-blacklivesmatter-came-to-define-a-
movement.html; #BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement, GUARD-
IAN (July 19, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter-birth-
civil-rights-movement (tracing the development of the response to the acquittal of George
Zimmerman into a global movement). The discussion that follows aims to follow the spirit
of the Movement to the extent that it recognizes both the struggle of people of color in its
particularity and the wider problem of marginalized identities to include other groups with
related and intersecting issues, not least economic justice. See Charles “Chip” P. Linscott,
All Lives (Don’t) Matter: The Internet Meets Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism, 8
BLACK CAMERA 104, 108 (2017) (“#BlackLivesMatter promotes feminism, trans* issues,
LGBTQ activism, immigration reform, economic justice, and so on. . . . In other words,
#BlackLivesMatter is not only about racial justice and police violence, but such is the crux
of the movement . . . . #BlackLivesMatter works for something in excess of equal represen-
tation, rights discourses, and cultural recognition, although those are all important compo-
nents of the movement.”).
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fronted the question of when storytelling should be admitted into the
realm of law, but in doing so, this approach imagines a legal domain with
fixed boundaries.2 As this article demonstrates, however, narrative also
impacts the parameters of the law.
As one example, the narrative implicit in Black Lives Matter reframes
the context in which people assess legal structures and policies.3 As Ta-
Nehisi Coates asserts, the “destruction of black bodies” by the “larger
culture . . . require[s] a new story told through the lens of our struggle.”4
This story, and its demand for recognition and empathy, implicate the
legal system as a mediator of social existence. The legal system operates
as the structure that, in Coates’ epigraph from Richard Wright,
“thrust[s]” the violated body, or “the sooty details of the scene,” “be-
tween the world” and the individual.5 The Black Lives counter narrative
calls attention to a boundary, informed by legal standards, that precludes
a black subject from enjoying freedom in the world.
Most recognizably, Black Lives Matter has begun to create a space that
recognizes how the law places different subjects beyond or within certain
margins. It does so through virtual collectives of communication,6 as well
as resistance in the streets.7 In the process, it calls attention to the narra-
tive frames granted authority in and beyond the law. Specifically, it ex-
poses the privileging of the bodies and perspectives of white people to
counter the implicit story of equality under the law. Black Lives Matter
thereby reveals the ways in which the cherished notion that subjects are
presumed innocent until proven guilty rings hollow when it is confined to
the courtroom or the four corners of a charging document. Instead, the
Movement demonstrates the need to expand the frame of this presump-
tion so as to make a physical and conceptual space for people of color to
enjoy the privileges of presumed innocence and freedom from unreasona-
ble searches, among other rights.
The modern state manages and dispenses life and death to its subjects
2. See Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836–38 (2005)
(offering a reading of Plato’s account of the relation of the “poet,” or the “belletristic
discourse” of literature, on one hand, to the “city,” or the discourse of the state, on the
other to propose a test of when narrative should be admitted into legal proceedings).
3. The contextual contingency of a narrative’s status is laid bare by the counter narra-
tive that emerged in response to the movement implicit in the “All Lives Matter” formula-
tion. See Chokshi, supra note 1 (outlining the development of the Movement and the
responses it precipitated).
4. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 44 (2015).
5. Id. at 2.
6. Linscott, supra note 1, at 107 (discussing the role of social media “as a productive
space for an undercommons—that is, a relatively untethered space for black life”).
7. George Yancy & Judith Butler, Opinion, What’s Wrong with ‘All Lives Matter’?,
N.Y. TIMES: THE STONE (Jan. 12, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
2015/01/12/whats-wrong-with-all-lives-matter/?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=12A5DD74
31DA1AE5002DA34720547D6D&gwt=pay&assetType=opinion (identifying public “as-
semblies, rallies and vigils [as] an open mourning for those whose lives were cut short and
without cause,” Judith Butler points to “people assembl[ing] in the street, arriv[ing] at
rallies or vigils, demonstrate[ing] with the aim of opposing this form of racist violence” as a
convergence of “practices of public mourning and political demonstration.”).
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through the workings of law.8 Foucault famously identified the way in
which the sovereign, from the late eighteenth century on, not only con-
trols whether individuals live or die, but also regulates human existence
generally.9 Building on this conception, which Foucault termed “bio-
power,” scholars in recent years have called attention to the contempo-
rary expression of sovereign power in the prioritizing of the state’s goal of
killing its enemy.10 In contemporary life, “the material destruction of
human bodies and populations” has been recognized as a “central pro-
ject” of the state.11 This expression of state power is typically identified in
the context of war or beyond the stable bounds of the recognized nation-
state, such as the colony, in which state resources are directed at killing
those deemed outside the state. Positing those beyond state bounds as the
enemy, the sovereign or state creates a space in which “the controls and
guarantees of judicial order can be suspended.”12 Epitomizing this phe-
nomenon, the colony becomes “the zone where the violence of the state
of exception [to the rule of law] is deemed to operate in the service of
‘civilization.’”13
However, the Movement for Black Lives makes visible the space of this
dynamic within the United States. It tells a counter story, challenging the
idea that American law and justice operate against a backdrop of pre-
sumed innocence.14 Of late, for example, the failure of people of color to
enjoy a presumption of innocence in what has been called “white
space”15 has come to the fore. This phenomenon has garnered broader
attention as a result of publicized incidents in which white bystanders
summoned police to arrest innocent people of color, including men wait-
ing to convene a business meeting at a Starbucks,16 men using a gym,17
8. See Michel Foucault, 17 March 1976, in “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LEC-
TURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1975-76, at 239, 241–43 (Mauro Bertani et al. eds.,
David Macey trans., Picador 2003) (1997) (discussing the sovereign’s “power to ‘make’ live
and ‘let’ die” and emergence of a “new technology of power,” the “‘biopolitics’ of the
human race”); see also Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Biopolitical Production, in BIO-
POLITICS: A READER 215 (Timothy Campbell & Adam Sitze eds., 2013); GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-Roazen
trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (1995).
9. Foucault, supra note 8, at 242–43.
10. See Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUB. CULTURE 11, 11–12 (Libby Meintjes
trans., 2003) (suggesting that the idea of biopower is not sufficient to understand the pro-
cess in which the state “makes the murder of the enemy its primary and absolute
objective”).
11. Id. at 14.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id.
14. The Platform of the Movement for Black Lives demands “an end to the war
against Black people.” Platform, supra note 1, at ¶ 6.
15. See Elijah Anderson, “The White Space,” 1 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 10 (2014)
(discussing perceptions by black people of neighborhoods previously occupied only by
white people as “the white space,” in which black people are marginalized when present).
16. Matt Stevens, Starbucks C.E.O. Apologizes After Arrests of 2 Black Men, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/15/us/starbucks-philadelphia-
black-men-arrest.html.
17. Charisse Jones, L.A. Fitness says employees accused of harassing two black men are
no longer with company, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
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women renting an Airbnb,18 a napping graduate student,19 and people
using their building’s swimming pool,20 among others going about their
daily lives.
Thus, this article calls attention to the inclusion of a space of legal ex-
ception that exists within the boundaries of legal protection and under-
cuts the goals of the law.21 In assessing the narratives made plain by the
Movement for Black Lives, this article draws on the metaphor of the city
as the space of law. In Kenji Yoshino’s reading of Plato, he identifies the
city as the place of law and the poet as the figure of “literature”—involv-
ing, among other things, narrative, rhetoric, emotion—who Plato’s Socra-
tes banishes from the city.22 Adopting the framework suggested by
Yoshino for the evaluation of narrative in legal practice and thinking, this
article looks to whether a narrative operates in service of “core state
function[s]” to assess its rightful place in relation to the workings of law.23
As this article argues, sensitivity to the way a legal subject’s space is
bounded—that is, included or exceptionalized—may serve the law’s ulti-
mate goals. Moreover, as this article demonstrates, rather than operate
either within or outside the structure of law, narrative also shapes the
money/2018/04/19/l-fitness-fires-threetwo-black-men-accuse-local-la-fitness-racial-profil
ing-three-employees-report/531865002/.
18. Daniel Victor, A Woman Said She Saw Burglars. They were Just Black Airbnb
Guests, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/airbnb-black-
women-police.html.
19. Christina Caron, A Black Yale Student Was Napping and a White Student Called
the Police, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/nyregion/yale-
black-student-nap.html. The failure to presume innocence extends to other marginalized
groups beyond the black community, as suggested by another recent reported incident in
which police were called when the presence of Native American teenagers on a college
tour prompted suspicion. See Niraj Chokshi, Native American Brothers Pulled From Cam-
pus Tour After Nervous Parent Calls Police, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/05/05/us/native-american-brothers-colorado.html.
20. Sarah Mervosh, A Black Man Wore Socks in the Pool. After Calling the Police on
Him, a Manager Got Fired, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/
us/memphis-pool-manager-fired-socks.html.
21. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1 (Kevin Attell, trans., Univ. of
Chicago Press 2005) (2003) (drawing on Carl Schmitt’s definition of the “sovereign” as “he
who decides the state of exception”).
22. Yoshino, supra note 2, at 1841–59.
23. Id. at 1878–85 (arguing for the exclusion of victim impact statements and the inclu-
sion of law-and-literature scholarship in legal academic discourse based on a “Platonic par-
adigm,” which considers these concerns). The place of narrative with respect to law has
been debated. See id. at 1836–37 (observing that although the “enterprise” of law-and-
literature “has penetrated the legal academy . . . the field continues to be plagued by skep-
ticism”). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE xv (3d ed. 2009) (expressing
skepticism about the practical implications of literary theory for law). But see ANTHONY
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 110 (2000) (“Law lives on narra-
tive”); GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 201 (2000);
Yoshino, supra note 2, at 1838–40 (identifying the “failed banishment” of literature by law
as “a foundational anxiety that has itself become an archetypal story” and advocating for
the inclusion of narratives that serve the ends of legal scholarship and practice); Guyora
Binder, The Poetics of the Pragmatic: What Literary Criticisms of Law Offers Posner, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1512 (2001) (highlighting the pragmatic significance of recognizing
“law” as “the art of composing society,” through which normative legal argument operates
as cultural criticism).
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space of law. Thus, following the metaphor, narrative can redefine the
space of the city.
This article proceeds as follows. Section II situates the Black Lives
Matter movement as a counter narrative that challenges the characteriza-
tion of the shared public space, among other aspects of contemporary
society, as the space of law. As discussed, a counter narrative means a
story that challenges a dominant narrative and the framework the domi-
nant narrative presumes.24 The concept of “necropower,” or the mobili-
zation and prioritization of the state’s power to kill, is used to make plain
the way the “sovereign”—the law on the books and its agents in prac-
tice—posits certain subjects as its enemy.
Section III identifies the place of the judge as the gatekeeper of the city
within the necropolitical structure. To do this, this article looks back at a
once-criticized set of judicial decisions that presciently rejected a norma-
tive framework presuming the guilt of people of color. Decisions by the
late U.S. District Court Judge Harold Baer in the case of Bayless v.
United States25 illustrate an attempt to challenge a master narrative of the
ordinary operation of law. Examining the Bayless decisions as one at-
tempt to recognize the exclusion of a community of color, this article ana-
lyzes the way this effort became snared in a necropolitical landscape in
the call for the judge’s impeachment. While Judge Baer struggled to cabin
myths that subvert the goals of law, he was ultimately confounded by the
social structure and by the complex relationship among myth, narrative,
and dicta. As a result, he ultimately displaced his attempt to resist the
systemic undermining of a presumption of innocence into dicta. Judge
Baer’s attempt to assert a counter narrative presuming innocence in prac-
tice ends up in the margins of legal space as dicta, pleading for the preser-
vation of defendants’ rights.26
Section IV demonstrates how the metaphorical poet (narrative,
counter narrative, rhetoric, etc.) plays a role in shaping the bounds of the
legal space on the ground, in respect to citizens, and in the discourse of
law. Adopting the boundary-challenging and empathy-demanding strate-
gies of Martin Luther King Jr.’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Utah v. Strieff recognizes necro-
power in order to resist it.27 Whereas King’s approach epitomizes the de-
stabilizing challenge of the poet, Justice Sotomayor’s echo of his
resistance retrospectively authorizes his narrative frame in the liminal
space of a dissenting opinion.28 Justice Sotomayor’s opinion highlights the
way the space of law—the metaphoric and at times literal city—is already
24. This notion of counter narrative remains value neutral and recognizes that counter
narrative can also be mobilized to counter the goals of law.
25. See generally Bayless v. United States, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Bayless I] (order granting motion to suppress); Bayless v. United States, 921 F. Supp.
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) [hereinafter Bayless II] (order denying motion to suppress).
26. See Bayless II, 921 F. Supp. 211, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
27. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–67 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
28. See id. at 2059.
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constituted as a place in which people are presumptively guilty. Acknowl-
edging the critique that Justice Sotomayor’s rhetorical posture may
threaten to universalize the estrangement of particular communities,29
the article nonetheless points to a historical language of resistance
through empathy and solidarity that Justice Sotomayor includes. As Sec-
tion IV demonstrates, narrative plays a crucial role in demarcating the
law. A broader application of the presumption of innocence to inform
judges’ determinations of reasonable suspicion and admissibility of evi-
dence could thereby serve to counter the exclusionary operation of legal
structures, at trial and on the streets. In this way, Section V concludes, the
counter narrative of Black Lives would shape the space of law to serve
the law’s goals.
II. BLACK LIVES MATTER: A COUNTER NARRATIVE
THAT REVEALS NECROPOLITICS
A. NARRATIVE IN AND BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW
Narrative has been long recognized as a fundamental mode of organiz-
ing human experience.30 The stories we tell shape the way we understand
our world and stories operate as particular powerful tools of persuasion.31
Master narratives, or so-called “stock stories,” influence the meaning of
experiences for groups in society and guide how people judge and assess
their experiences.32 While stereotypes threaten to distort assessment and
prediction,33 narrative plays a significant role in expressing—and thereby
revealing—values and perspectives that shape understandings of
experience.34
The scholarly push in the last decades of the twentieth century for
storytelling as a tool of social justice and legal intervention articulated a
concern about the omission of certain stories.35 Though the question of
which stories warrant telling in the law persists, the structure of the
American legal system embraces narrative as a means of assessing experi-
29. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
YALE L.J. 2054, 2057 (2017).
30. Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 4
(1991).
31. Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old Story: Using Narrative Theory to Understand
and Overcome the Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 25–26 (2014).
32. Peter Brooks, “Inevitable Discovery”—Law, Narrative, Retrospectivity, 15 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 71, 100 (2003); Ralph, supra note 31, at 26 (“Stock stories can be consid-
ered cultural master stories or myths that give meaning to social experiences”).
33. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 123–24 (2011) (discussing
how stereotypes preclude consideration of more relevant contextual factors).
34. But see Yoshino, supra note 2, at 1862–63 (rejecting the “ineradicability defense”
of literature, which asserts that it cannot be “banished [from the “city” or space of law]
because it is impossible to separate from other textual practices, including philosophy and
law,” and thereby ostensibly renders the argument for its banishment moot).
35. See BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 23, at 201 (synthesizing recurring issues
raised by proponents of narrative legal scholarship in the late 1980s).
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ence in light of potentially competing values.36 Counter narrative plays a
fundamental role in the criminal trial process. Defendants have the right
to confrontation plus cross-examination of witnesses under the Sixth
Amendment.37 A framework of evidentiary rules that establish a low pre-
sumptive threshold of admissibility further invites counter narrative.38
Thus, the adversarial structure creates a space for mobilizing competing
narratives in the course of counter claims about the meaning of facts.39
Moreover, the recording of counter argument in the form of minority ju-
dicial opinions, notwithstanding their potential to weaken the rule of
law,40 further demonstrates the place granted counter narrative as a legal
tool.
In addition to creating a place for counter argument, cross-examination
and minority opinions invite lawyers and judges to mobilize stories in
presenting facts, and the determination of their significance depends,
“largely upon one’s choice (considered or unconsidered) of some overall
narrative as best describing what happened or how the world works.”41
Arguments and decisions are impacted by “what does and doesn’t matter
to a culture,” which itself “can be traced back through the culture’s sto-
ries, its genres, to its enduring myths.”42 Thus, competing legal opinions
cannot be extricated from social context. And these social contexts are
ultimately shaped not only by scholarly interventions, but by popular
narratives.43
Against the backdrop of master narratives that shape social existence
36. Cf. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 4, 14
(2003) (tracing development of adversary system in part to attempt by judges to correct for
unreliable prosecutorial techniques).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38. See FED. R. EVID. 401. Courts have referred to the “low threshold for evidence”
under Rule 401; see, e.g., United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that although testimony had only minimal relevance as background evidence, it
satisfied “Rule 401‘s low threshold for relevance”); United States v. Colbert, 828 F.3d 718,
727–28 (8th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that “[t]he threshold for relevance is ‘quite mini-
mal’”) (citation omitted).
39. See John Leubsdorf, Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 448
(2001) (“[T]he interweaving of stories and voices constitutes the structure of a judicial
opinion.”).
40. See MARK TUSHNET, I DISSENT: GREAT OPPOSING OPINIONS IN LANDMARK SU-
PREME COURT CASES xii (2008).
41. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 111.
42. Id.
43. As Lani Guinier asserts, “the arguments of movement elites, feminist intellectuals,
and respected authorities may circulate slowly but can ultimately gain traction in popular
culture.” Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4,
13–14 (2008). Perhaps most saliently of late, the legal traction that can result from an up-
surge of narrative has been demonstrated by legal developments attributed to the #MeToo
Movement. See, e.g., Yohana Desta, Months After #MeToo Began, Harvey Weinstein Has
Been Charged with Rape, VANITY FAIR (May 25, 2018, 7:57 AM), https://www.vanityfair
.com/hollywood/2018/05/harvey-weinstein-surrender-police; Graham Bowley & Jon Hur-
dle, Bill Cosby Is Found Guilty of Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/arts/television/bill-cosby-guilty-retrial.html (describing the verdict
as considered by many “a watershed moment” “in the aftermath of the #MeToo
movement”).
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and inform legal structures,44 counter narratives—which reframe facts
and evidence so as to challenge their purported significance—also bring
to light stock stories impacting social and legal norms. Counter narratives
can thereby influence the very bounds of what is accepted as the space of
the law.
B. BLACK LIVES MATTER AS COUNTER NARRATIVE
The Movement for Black Lives challenges the boundaries of law by
calling attention to the master narrative and its impacts on legal subjects.
The name “Black Lives Matter” serves as a response to the master narra-
tive that thereby highlights prevailing assumptions.45 The name itself of-
fers a counter narrative—an alternative account that also questions the
presumed narrative framework. While the master narrative presumes the
effective workings of law, the name “Black Lives Matter” rebuts this pre-
sumption in light of the goals of the law. It points to the failure of the
socio-legal structure to acknowledge that black people are not valued as
lives.46 In offering a counter narrative, it calls attention to the missing
space of the black person in the “city” or the place of legal protection.47
“Black Lives Matter” thereby brings to light how law circumscribes the
physical space that a person of color occupies. In addition, it highlights
how the legal structure shapes the place of that person in relation to legal
norms.
44. The mutually constituting dynamic of law and society has been explored by legal
historians in various contexts. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN
AMERICA 20 (1965) (arguing that American contract law developed “roughly coextensive
with the free market”); Sarah Barringer Gordon, A War of Words: Revelation and Story-
telling in the Campaign Against Mormon Polygamy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 739, 741 (2003)
(describing “storytelling that was key to the development of anti-Mormon legal
strategies”).
45. See Yancy & Butler, supra note 7 (George Yancy characterizing the name as “a
mode of address” in Butler’s terms). Through a similar counter narrative move that ex-
poses the presumptions and workings of the master narrative, Ta-Nehisi Coates’ Between
the World and Me positions its “woke” account of life as a black American as a direct
counter narrative to the master narrative of the American Dream. In urging the reader to
consciousness of the “weight of the Dream,” it tells a story about the power granted to
“White America” used to “dominate and control [black] bodies,” in which the social expe-
rience of people of color is shaped by pervasive legal structures, such as mob law, “lynch-
ing,” legislation “redlining,” and the exercise of police power exemplified by police
shootings of black boys and men. COATES, supra note 4, at 42, 76–77, 119. Coates exposes
the social impact of this last category in part through his account of his own processing of
the death of a Howard University classmate shot and killed by police while driving in
Virginia.
46. See Yancy & Butler, supra note 7 (arguing that the name “Black Lives Matter”
exposes the fact that the lives of black people do not matter and suggesting that they are
not recognized as human lives).
47. Discussing Aristotle’s view that the essence of narrative is the “plot,” Peter Brooks
calls attention to the range of meanings of the word, including a demarcated space or
“piece of ground, generally used for a specific purpose.” Peter Brooks, Reading for the
Plot, in ESSENTIALS OF THE THEORY OF FICTION 201, 208 (Michael J. Hoffman & Patrick
D. Murphy eds., 2005). The Movement for Black Lives calls attention to the relationship of
bounded narratives and bounded space that otherwise “heterogeneous meanings” of
“plot” imply. See id.
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In conceptualizing the workings of the state, scholars have recognized
the operation of “biopower”—the ways the state in its ordinary operation
manages and dispenses life and death to its subjects.48 Biopolitics in-
volves the state’s prioritization of its power to kill and the way it posits
those deemed outside the state as enemies.49
Using the colony and spaces of war as primary examples, political theo-
rist Achille Mbembe has identified a particular way biopolitics operates
as “necropolitics.”50 In this framework, the so-called “state of exception,”
involving enemies in war or in a colony, justifies a deviation from the
norms of law.51 The colony, like a war zone, epitomizes the space in
which “sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power
outside the law.”52 Thus, colonies and war zones are posited as concep-
tual and literal frontiers of the law, in which the inhabitants are not con-
sidered human or valued life, but rather the enemy. This in turn justifies
the mobilization of state power against them.53 Among other things, the
creation of the “state of exception”54 “involves the setting of boundaries
and internal frontiers.”55 The Movement for Black Lives calls attention to
the creation of what might be called a literal and figurative “space of
exception” within our cities and within the law.
Necropower and the creation of spaces of exception have typically
been identified in sites beyond the stable bounds of the recognized na-
tion-state.56 The Movement for Black Lives calls attention to this dy-
namic and the space of exception it creates within the United States.
Black Lives Matter highlights the existence of a space of exception by
telling a story that rebuts the dominant narrative that American law and
48. See Foucault, supra note 8, at 241–43 (discussing the sovereign’s “power to ‘make’
live and ‘let’ die” and emergence of a “new technology of power,” the “‘biopolitics’ of the
human race”); see also AGAMBEN, supra note 8; Hardt & Negri, supra note 8, at 215.
49. Foucault, supra note 8, at 241–43; Mbembe, supra note 10, at 25–35.
50. Mbembe, supra note 10, at 25–35.
51. Id. at 16 (Power “continuously refers and appeals to exception, emergency, and a
?ctionalized notion of the enemy. It also labors to produce that same exception, emer-
gency, and ?ctionalized enemy.”).
52. Id. at 23.
53. See id. at 25 (“Colonial occupation itself was a matter of seizing, delimiting, and
asserting control over a physical geographical area—of writing on the ground a new set of
social and spatial relations.”).
54. I use the term “state of exception,” developed by Giorgio Agamben and derived
from the work of Carl Schmitt, to describe the way the state or sovereign itself “tran-
scends” or excepts itself from the rule of law ostensibly for the good of the state. See
AGAMBEN, supra note 21, at 1 (drawing on Schmitt’s definition of the “sovereign” as “he
who decides the state of exception”). In terms of the implications of the phenomenon in
contemporary life, the political-theoretical notion of the state of exception overlaps in
meaningful ways with the socio-legal diagnosis of “legal estrangement” offered by Monica
Bell, which recognizes that certain groups within the United States see themselves “as
essentially stateless—unprotected by the law and its enforcers and marginal to the project
of making American society.” See Bell, supra note 29, at 2056–57.
55. Mbembe, supra note 10, at 25–26.
56. But see CHRIS HAYES, A COLONY IN A NATION 32, 38 (2017) (arguing the Ameri-
can criminal justice system operates two racially distinct regimes, creating a “Colony” in
which people, “overwhelmingly black and brown,” are subjected to policing characteristic
of “an occupied land”).
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justice operate in a context of presumed innocence.57 In its demand to
“End the War on Black People,”58 the Movement for Black Lives under-
scores the positioning of people of color as subjects outside the space of
the legal protections of the state. In this space of exception to the law,
black lives are preemptively deemed the enemy, subject to the power of
the state to kill. Calling attention to the conceptual and practical space of
exception of the law (in communities of color or surrounding the black
body, for example),59 the Movement thereby resists the normalization of
legal process and social structures at odds with the goals of law through
counter narrative. Thus, for example, Judith Butler identifies common
perceptions by police and others that people of color are threatening as
“war zones of the mind that play out on the street.”60 Mobilizing the met-
aphors and realities of sovereign borders, Butler demonstrates the impact
in real space of an implicit necropolitical norm.61
Through this reframing and related action, the Movement also begins
to make a space for the excluded citizen and her narrative. Not only does
the name “Black Lives Matter” call attention to who is recognized as a
human subject by society and law, but the mode of resistance challenges
the physical bounding out of certain groups.62 The Movement does so by
seeking to reclaim public space. As Butler describes it, “when people as-
semble in the street, arrive at rallies or vigil, demonstrate with the aim of
opposing this form of racist violence, they are ‘speaking back’ to this
mode of address, insisting on what should be obvious but is not, namely
that these lost lives are unacceptable losses.”63 Because it is precisely in
public spaces that certain people are subjected to state violence, the act of
taking to the streets in opposing racism and violence “reverberates
throughout the public sphere through various media.”64 Indeed, the
57. The Platform of the Movement for Black Lives demands “an end to the war
against Black people.” Platform, supra note 1, at ¶ 6.
58. End the War on Black People, THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://pol-
icy.m4bl.org/end-war-on-black-people/ [https://perma.cc/UYJ3-9SJK] (last visited February
24, 2018).
59. See, e.g., Linscott, supra note 6, at 113 (“[T]he capacity to take life is the domain of
the sovereign and is closely aligned with the power to consign the living to the realms of
the living dead . . . Those without power are forbidden from taking life, yet their lives are
always already in peril . . . Ghettoization, police brutality and murder, state terror, the
criminal justice system, mass incarceration, fungibility, generational poverty, displacement,
refusal of basic services (think Flint, Michigan’s lead-poisoned water) and the like are the
sovereign’s tools. In America, black social death is necessary in order for white sovereignty
to flourish—now, just as it ever was during slavery.”).
60. Yancy & Butler, supra note 7. Butler explains, “every time a grand jury or a police
review board accepts this form of reasoning, they ratify the idea that blacks are a popula-
tion against which society must be defended, and that the police defend themselves and
(white) society, when they preemptively shoot unarmed black men in public space.”
61. Id.
62. Cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson, The Right to the Public Square: Hoodies, Head Veils,
& Bathrooms, MUFTAH (Mar. 23, 2017), https://muftah.org/right-public-square-hoodies-
head-veils-bathrooms/ [https://perma.cc/3QU5-6FSM] (identifying the disenfranchising im-
pact of seemingly disparate regulations of individuals’ existence in public space, such as
dress and gender-based access to bathrooms, and the corresponding resistance).
63. Yancy & Butler, supra note 7.
64. Id.
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Movement has made space for and thereby disseminated its message via
hyperlink and the virtual space contemporary media enables.65 Thus,
highlighting the space of legal exception through affirmation of an ex-
cluded and thereby negated population,66 this counter narrative has
pushed for the physical space of the subject within the state.
In Section IV, this article examines how an empathetic counter narra-
tive has created space to recognize necropower in the law. Before doing
so, Section III analyzes an underexplored series of decisions that illus-
trate the challenge faced by a judge as the arbiter of the bounds of the
literal city as the space of law and the role of narrative in shaping that
space.
III. FRAMING NARRATIVE AND POLICING MYTH:
THE TRIALS OF THE GATEKEEPER
While the Movement for Black Lives challenges the master narrative of
our society and the legal framework, the issue of criminal justice critically
manifests the problem of exclusion.67 The question of what evidence may
be admitted in court makes literal the process of bounding the space of
law (and its narrative elements). It also influences the way state actors,
such as the police, are authorized and incentivized to except certain peo-
ple from the otherwise presumptive protections of the Constitution. In
particular, the laws governing the admissibility of evidence affect the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment.68 Judges have some ability to shape the contours of
the narratives that give meaning to evidence, policing authority and ad-
missible evidence.69 Judges may thereby affirm or resist the bounds of a
broader social narrative. This process, however, remains embedded in
competing narrative frames, which may implicate the legitimacy of the
law. And this underscores the threat of narrative as a potent but
mercurial tool to counter injustice.70 Judges must recognize the potential
for narrative to shape the space of the legal subject. In negotiating this
dynamic, judges must also consider the goals of law, such as the presumed
innocence of the subject, and the consequent presumptive inclusion in the
space of the state.
65. Linscott, supra note 6, at 115.
66. Id. at 114 (positioning “#BlackLivesMatter” “in the space between these two
poles” of social death and “black life less captured by white sovereignty”).
67. Linscott, supra note 6, at 108 (describing the “racial justice and police violence” as
“the crux” of a broader movement).
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
69. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 41, at 111 (“[I]ncreasingly we are coming
to recognize that both the questions and the answers in such matters of ‘fact’ depend
largely upon one’s choice (considered or unconsidered) of some overall narrative as best
describing what happened or how the world works.”); see also Brooks, supra note 32,
71–72 (2003) (expressing skepticism about the extent to which the role of narrative is ac-
knowledged within the legal community).
70. See Yoshino, supra note 2, at 1841–42.
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In this section, this article looks at a pair of decisions that together
illustrate the ways that narrative—in the form of myth, politics, and
dicta—contributes to the demarcation of the space of law, both in the
courtroom and on the street. This article analyzes federal district court
decisions that presciently struggle to create a space of inclusion. Analyz-
ing how Judge Harold Baer sought to counter an implicitly biased master
narrative that presumes the guilt of certain subjects, this article shows
how he ultimately fell short of his goal. He did so not because of his
ultimate concession to the designation of a neighborhood in Washington
Heights as a space of exclusion, but in his fraught disavowal of dicta as
essential to the law. By failing to acknowledge how narrative gives shape
to the meaning of legal terms, he ceded some of the space of the counter
narrative of presumed innocence, despite his ultimate appeal to this very
principle.
A. BAYLESS I : COUNTERING MYTH, PRESUMING INNOCENCE
In the context of the admissibility of evidence, a pair of once-news-
worthy71 and prescient decisions illustrate how different forms of narra-
tive influence the bounds of law, both to serve and to undermine the
law’s ultimate goals. U.S. District Court Judge Harold Baer’s decisions in
Bayless I and Bayless II72 reveal the judge’s role in framing a legal narra-
tive in a necessarily social context. They demonstrate the challenge of
ascribing meaning to evidence without engaging a “mythic” structure that
undermines the goals of law.73 Suppressing evidence of a drug crime for
lack of reasonable suspicion to justify a brief investigatory or “Terry”
stop,74 Judge Baer’s opinion regarding the first pre-trial hearing in Bay-
less I begins by quoting John F. Kennedy in an epigraph: “The great en-
emy of truth is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived, and
71. One contemporaneous New York Times article referred to “an avalanche of criti-
cism and calls for [Judge Baer’s] ouster.” Don Van Natta Jr., Under Pressure, Federal Judge
Reverses Decision in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 1996) [hereinafter Van Natta, Federal
Judge Reverses Decision], https://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/02/nyregion/under-pressure-
federal-judge-reverses-decision-in-drug-case.html; see also Don Van Natta Jr., Not Suspi-
cious to Flee Police, Judge Declares, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Van Natta, Not
Suspicious to Flee Police], https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/25/nyregion/not-suspicious-to-
flee-police-judge-declares.html (reporting holding in Bayless I); John M. Goshko, Accusa-




72. See Bayless I, 913 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Bayless II, 921 F. Supp. 211,
211–12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
73. See ROLAND BARTHES, Myth Today, in MYTHOLOGIES 217, 234–40 (Richard How-
ard trans., Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2012) (1957) (identifying “myth” as a form of expres-
sion that “transforms history into nature,” obscuring its intention so as to “appear[ ] both
like a notification and like a statement of fact”).
74. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (extending Fourth Amendment protec-
tions against “unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government to brief investiga-
tory stops of persons or vehicles).
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dishonest—but the myth—persistent, pervasive and realistic.”75 In this
way, the decision highlights a self-conscious engagement of narrative, if
only in the end to struggle to contain it.
In Bayless I, Judge Baer granted a motion to suppress post-arrest state-
ments, along with thirty-four kilograms of cocaine and two kilograms of
heroin found in the trunk of the car of the defendant. The defendant, “a
middle-aged black woman,” was observed around five in the morning
driving in a rental car with Michigan license plates in Washington
Heights, New York.76 Judge Baer’s decision resists what he suggests is the
“myth” implicit in the state’s framing of reasonable suspicion. His deci-
sion in Bayless I rejects the purported significance of certain signs as
presented by the state, including the police observation of males ap-
proaching the car “in single file,” the sighting of a car with Michigan
plates double parked in the early morning, and the claim that the same
males later ran off upon sighting an unmarked police car, along with the
police characterization of the neighborhood as a drug hub.77 Judge Baer
held that together, these details failed to meet the standard of articulable
facts that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify
the stop.78
Notably, in Bayless I Judge Baer self-consciously critiques the prevail-
ing narrative. He does so in his approach to the question of reasonable
suspicion. The requirement of reasonable suspicion to justify a legal stop
establishes the bounds beyond which a person inhabits a world free of
search and seizure by the police. Moreover, by breaking with convention
to include a quote of John F. Kennedy in an epigraph to his decision,
Judge Baer points to the implicit operation of myth. Speaking at Yale
University Commencement in 1962, President Kennedy urged his genera-
tion to “disenthrall itself from . . . stereotypes” in an effort to confront the
“real issues” such as “how [to] eradicate the barriers which separate sub-
stantial minorities of our citizens from access to education and employ-
ment on equal terms with the rest” to “provide . . . opportunity for all.”79
The speech denounces myth as described by Roland Barthes: a totalizing
framework that qualifies the meaning of the underlying signs and allows
itself to be appropriated, distinct from a rigorous examination of data and
meaning.80 Thus, by making a place for allusion and intertextuality, Judge
75. Bayless I, 913 F. Supp. at 234 (quoting President John F. Kennedy, Commence-
ment Address at Yale University (June 11, 1962)). The invocation of “myth” calls to mind
Roland Barthes’ conception of how myth “transforms history into nature”—making con-
tingency, specific history, and intention appear natural and eternal. BARTHES, supra note
73, at 240, 254.
76. Bayless I, 913 F. Supp. at 234.
77. Id. at 240 (“The mere presence of an individual in a neighborhood known for its
drug activity which here was characterized as from 155th Street to the end of Manhattan,
fails to raise a reasonable suspicion that the person observed is there to purchase drugs”).
78. Id. at 238.
79. John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at Yale University (June 11, 1962),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29661[https://perma.cc/EG5N-
CXFY].
80. See BARTHES, supra note 73, at 227–29.
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Baer aims in his decision to counter myth or, in this case, the master
narrative that treats people of color with suspicion.
Foregrounding his impression of the defendant as having the more
credible account,81 Judge Baer polices the gates of the law and grants the
motion to suppress. He excludes elements of a story to serve the law’s
goals—the protection of people from unreasonable search and seizure.82
Bayless I thereby applies the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio that a
limited investigative stop “must be based on ‘a reasonable suspicion sup-
ported by articulable facts’ that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’”83
The state asserts reasonable suspicion justifying a police stop on the
basis of a sighting by the officers around five a.m. of a car with Michigan
license plates “moving slowly along 176th Street” and pulling over to
double park “[b]efore reaching the intersection of 176th Street and St.
Nicholas Avenue.”84 In the police account, four males emerged when the
car stopped and “crossed the street walking single file” as the defendant
pressed the trunk release.85 One male then opened the trunk, others
placed “large black duffel bag[s] in the trunk,” and another closed it.86
During this time the police observed no conversation between the driver
and these males.87 As the driver continued on to the streetlight, the males
noticed the officers’ unmarked car and “moved in different directions at a
rapid gait. The individual that . . . [Officer Carroll] watched went to the
corner of 176th and St. Nicholas, and as he reached the corner began to
run northbound on St. Nicholas.”88 “[S]hortly thereafter,” the light
turned green and the car “proceeded at a normal rate of speed” with the
police following, pulling the defendant over two blocks later.89 As the
decision notes, the officer attributed his decision to pull over the car to
the out-of-state license plate; the actions of the four males, particularly
the way they crossed the street in single file and did not speak with the
driver of the car; the fact that the males ran once they noticed the of-
ficers; and the duffle bags the males placed in the trunk of the car.90
81. Judge Baer characterizes the officer’s uncorroborated testimony as “gossamer”
and calls attention to a recent prosecution of an anti-crime police officer for corruption as
well as the community view of the local police as “corrupt, abusive and violent.” Bayless I,
913 F. Supp. at 239, 242. In contrast, the defendant’s statements implicating her son under-
score her credibility to Judge Baer. Id. at 234.
82. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83. Bayless I, 913 F. Supp. at 238 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S 1, 7
(1989)). In doing so, Judge Baer invokes Terry’s two-part test for evaluating reasonable-
ness, considering “[f]irst, whether the stop its self was based on a reasonable suspicion that
the suspect ‘is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity’” and, if so,
“whether the stop was reasonably related in scope” to the justifying circumstances. Id.
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).





89. Id. at 235–36.
90. Id. at 236.
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After recounting the defendant’s videotaped statement,91 in which
some details differed from those in the police testimony,92 and reviewing
the standard of reasonable suspicion as an exception to the requirement
of probable cause to arrest, Judge Baer’s decision finds the facts collec-
tively fail to meet the requisite standard.93 The decision expresses skepti-
cism about the police account, not least because of its lack of
corroboration by the second officer on the scene and the defendant’s
statements against interest.94 In Bayless I, Judge Baer also notes the dis-
crepancies between the facts presented, including whether there was an-
other person in the car.95 Thus, Bayless I carefully articulates a counter
narrative, which brings to the fore the defendant’s presumed guilt that
Judge Baer resists.
Bayless I begins by rejecting “the mere presence of an individual in a
neighborhood known for its drug activity” as determining reasonable sus-
picion.96 “Similarly,” it rejects the implications of sighting a person in this
space in this early time of day.97 Instead, Judge Baer characterizes the
sighting of the defendant by police in the early morning hours as “nothing
unusual,” considering that in “New York City, people travel to and from
work at all hours of the day and night.”98 Establishing the context as a
global tourist hub teeming with legitimate enterprise—rather than an in-
ner-city drug zone—Judge Baer similarly counters an assessment by testi-
fying Officer Carroll that it was “odd that a person is seen to drive a car
with a Michigan license plate in Manhattan.”99 Instead, Judge Baer iden-
tifies New York as “a city that considers itself ‘The Capital of the
World,’” and notes that “it is certainly not odd for one to observe double
parked cars on a Manhattan street”100 as the police claim they did. Thus,
Judge Baer doubts the state’s characterization of the area as a “hub for
the drug trade.”101 He gestures toward the necropolitical dynamic both in
the space of northern Manhattan and that surrounds black bodies. He
asserts, “[w]hat I find shattering is that in this day and age blacks in black
neighborhoods and blacks in white neighborhoods can count on little se-
curity for their person.”102
Distinguishing the facts at hand from cases involving “furtive conduct
91. The decision notes that despite no promise of immunity or special consideration,
her account included also “detailed her involvement in 20 other similar transactions.” Id.
92. Id. at 236–37. Among other details, including the presence of another driver (with
the defendant in the passenger seat), the defendant testified the men walked away; they
did not run. Id.
93. Id. at 238–40.
94. Id. at 239–40.
95. Id.





101. See id. at 240 n.12.
102. Id. at 240. To punctuate this, he then quotes Thomas Paine on the need for egalita-
rian government. Id.
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and evasive behavior” by the defendant,103 Judge Baer reframes the po-
lice account of males allegedly spotted running from the scene.104 Though
he remains skeptical of police testimony,105 “even assuming that one or
more of the males ran away from the corner” upon becoming aware of
the police presence, Judge Baer refuses to “characterize this as evasive
conduct.”106 He notes that unmarked police vehicles “are easily recog-
nized, particularly, in this area of Manhattan,”107 and invokes residents’
tendency to “regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and violent,” even
prior to a recent successful “prosecution of a corrupt police officer of an
anti-crime unit operating in this very neighborhood.”108 In light of the
nature of this place as a space of legal exception, to Judge Baer’s mind,
“had the men not run when the cops began to stare at them, it would
have been unusual.”109 Through repeated recontextualization, Judge
Baer’s account opens the evidence at hand to meaning in ways that con-
tinue to resonate today.110
Implicitly, Judge Baer confronts the power of myth to shape the spe-
cific historical and contextual significance of signs.111 He exposes how
myth can distort meaning in his concluding appraisal of the duffel bags
found to contain a large quantity of illegal drugs. Judge Baer resists the
pull of narrative cohesion that colors objects with overdetermined signifi-
cance,112 and reclaims the presumptive innocence of innocuous objects.
He asserts, “[d]uffle bags are commonly and regularly used to transport
103. Id. at 241.
104. Though the defendant observed all traffic regulations and did not drive erratically,
“[w]hen pressed on the issue of evasive or furtive conduct” the testifying officer admitted
that rather than the behavior of the defendant, the behavior of the four males at the scene
was evasive.
105. Judge Baer rejects the police account of the males at the scene running in light of
the defendant’s competing testimony. Id.
106. Id. at 242.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. A footnote goes further, explaining that during a four year federal investigation
and prosecution of corruption and unjustified arrests by officers assigned to Washington
Heights’ anti-crime unit, U.S. attorneys uncovered evidence “that members of the anti-
crime unit committed perjury or made false statements in connection with various arrests
and the prosecution of both federal and state crimes.” Id. at 242 n.18.
110. In addition to the legal significance of fleeing or avoiding the police while black,
discussed in Section IV, contemporary counter narratives invite reconsideration of the sig-
nificance of a host of signs. See infra Section IV; Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative
Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673, 1676–78 (2017) (analyzing ways in which the
“hoodie” variously figures as evidence of crime or individual expression). For a discussion
of pretext-stop strategies in the mid-1990s as a result of policies aimed at reducing gun
crimes in poor neighborhoods in Washington D.C. and their contribution to disparities in
the criminal justice system and beyond, see JAMES FORMAN, LOCKING UP OUR OWN
185–216 (2017).
111. See BARTHES, supra note 73, at 227–31.
112. As the celebrated late nineteenth-century Russian playwright and short story
writer Anton Chekhov famously asserted, “Remove everything that has no relevance to
the story. If you say in the first chapter that there is a rifle hanging on the wall, in the
second or third chapter it absolutely must go off. If it’s not going to be fired, it shouldn’t be
hanging there.” VALENTINE T. BILL, Chekhov: The Silent Voice of Freedom (1987).
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things from clothing to equipment.”113 “[P]eople placing duffle bags into
the trunk of an out of state car in the early morning” is “far from suspi-
cious,” but rather “consistent with a person leaving early in the morning
on a long drive to return home to Michigan after visiting relatives in New
York City.”114 The failure of the state to offer evidence in support of the
“characteriz[ation]” of this space as a “neighborhood . . . [of] drug activity
. . . from 155th Street to the end of Manhattan”115 enables Judge Baer to
recast it as part of a benign landscape of the city—literally and
metaphorically.
In this way, Judge Baer takes on the role of protecting the city from an
untrustworthy “poet”—the myth that imbues potentially innocent objects
and actions with racially motivated suspicion. In doing so, he extends the
landscape to include the subject in the presumption of innocence. At the
same time, he does not have adequate tools to challenge the narrative
structures beyond the courtroom in light of the standard of proof in sup-
pression hearings.116 He lacks an explicit doctrinal tool to mobilize a pre-
sumption of innocence in policing the admissibility of evidence. As
suggested by his acknowledgement of the tensions in the neighborhood
with police, the socio-political backlash, and legal developments in this
case, the necropolitical framework informs the way the bounds of law are
demarcated in the social narrative. Without a doctrinal tool to acknowl-
edge this, Judge Baer ultimately rejects his own initial effort to use dicta
to broaden the landscape of inclusion, even though this is a tenable and
arguably essential, goal of the law.
B. BAYLESS II : THE “CHARACTER OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD”
AND THE BANISHMENT OF DICTA117
This could be the end of a story of counter narrative that emerged from
social movements that penetrated the law and impacted the application
of the reasonable suspicion standard in ways that continue to resonate
113. Bayless I, 913 F. Supp. at 242.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 240.
116. Evidentiary doctrine favors the inclusion of evidence, relying on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, among other safeguards at trial to protect the rights of defendants. See,
e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012) (“The Constitution . . . protects a
defendant against a conviction based on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohib-
iting introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the
jury that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit. Constitutional safe-
guards available to defendants to counter the State’s evidence include the Sixth Amend-
ment rights to counsel, compulsory process, and confrontation plus cross-examination of
witnesses. Apart from these guarantees, we have recognized, state and federal statutes and
rules ordinarily govern the admissibility of evidence, and juries are assigned the task of
determining the reliability of the evidence presented at trial. Only when evidence ‘is so
extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice,’ have we
imposed a constraint tied to the Due Process Clause.”) (citations omitted). In refusing to
require a judicial evaluation of the reliability of eye witness identification in the absence of
improper state conduct, the Supreme Court in Perry tempered its recognition of unreliable
evidence as a due process concern. See id. at 247.
117. Bayless II, 921 F. Supp. 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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today. However, the developments in this case make plain the challenge
of resisting a necropolitical framework from within the law. At the same
time, these developments underscore the role of dicta as one critical tool
for negotiating the boundaries of law toward inclusion, notwithstanding
Judge Baer’s ambivalent reconsideration of his own.
The Bayless I decision faced a strong negative reaction in the political
realm and the press. The public outcry made unusually plain the way doc-
trine and the judge are situated in a broader socio-political structure,
including the existing trend toward increasing incarceration.118 Charac-
terized as “tortured reasoning,”119 the Bayless I decision prompted an
intense public reaction, including from New York City Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani and Governor George Pataki (both Republicans) as well as Pres-
ident Bill Clinton (a Democrat).120 Reflecting the prevailing acceptance
of the primacy of confrontational policing to rid neighborhoods of crime,
one New York Times editorial deemed the decision “judicial malprac-
tice.”121 Calls for Judge Baer’s impeachment from the national political
stage further indicate the potency of the master narrative directed at rid-
ding the landscape of an enemy.122
Against this backdrop, Judge Baer granted a motion for reconsidera-
tion and reargument in Bayless II.123 He ultimately admitted the evidence
and post-arrest statements.124 His decision demonstrates the struggle to
118. See COMM. ON CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014). This trend was exacerbated by the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 mandating life sentences for criminals convicted of a
violent felony after two prior convictions, including drug crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)
(2012).
119. Editorial, Judge Baer’s Tortured Reasoning, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Editorial, Judge Baer’s Tortured Reasoning], https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/31/opin-
ion/judge-baer-s-tortured-reasoning.html. Though it conceded that Judge Baer might have
been “correct in observing that the corruption scandal” in the area “would have made it
‘unusual’ had the men not run away,” it argues “that does not support a legal finding that
flight is not a factor to be weighed” for a determination of reasonable suspicion. Id.; see
also Editorial, The Drug Judge, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. REC.
H2310 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1996).
120. Clifford Krauss, Giuliani and Bratton Assail U.S. Judge’s Ruling in Drug Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/27/nyregion/giuliani-and-
bratton-assail-us-judge-s-ruling-in-drug-case.html; Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge
to Relent, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/22/nyregion/clin-
ton-pressing-judge-to-relent.html; Don Van Natta Jr., Judge Baer Takes Himself off Drug
Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/17/nyregion/judge-
baer-takes-himself-off-drug-case.html; Van Natta, Federal Judge Reverses Decision, supra
note 71.
121. Editorial, Judge Baer’s Tortured Reasoning, supra note 119 (“By far the most
troubling aspect of the decision is the judge’s superfluous finding that even if every detail
of the account were true, it would still not justify the investigatory stop.”). The editorial
expresses concern, ultimately echoed by Judge Baer in Bayless II, for the “law-abiding
citizens in minority neighborhoods” who may as a result suffer “a lower standard of polic-
ing.” Id.
122. Congressional Republicans cited Judge Baer and his decision in challenging Presi-
dent Clinton’s judicial appointees. Van Natta, Judge Baer Takes Himself off Drug Case,
supra note 120.
123. Bayless II, 921 F. Supp. 211, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
124. Id.
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demarcate the space of the law. The regret he expresses for his dicta and
his ambivalent approach to the challenge of myth epitomize this struggle.
Moreover, whether Judge Baer was ultimately guided by the evidence,
the political climate and popular reaction, or, in the view of a legal realist,
some combination of all, the decision nonetheless illustrates the con-
tested role of narrative in influencing the space of law.
In Bayless II, Judge Baer comes to consider the defendant’s testimony
on the stand in light of corroborating police testimony and reports—the
initial absence of which had contributed to his assessment of the police’s
lack of credibility.125 This evidence, and the government affirmations
describing drug trafficking activity in the area, persuaded Judge Baer that
the police had a “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’”126 Bayless II accepts that the govern-
ment demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the police had a
“reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in
criminal activity” at the time of the stop.127 Rather than require the gov-
ernment to bring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard man-
dated for suppression hearings requires only proof by a preponderance of
the credible evidence.128
In addition to the significance of this doctrinal demarcation of legal
narrative and the facts allowed in the courtroom, this decision turns on
the acceptance of the state’s delineation of the site of the stop. In Bayless
II, Judge Baer ultimately accepts the state’s characterization of the neigh-
borhood as a space of crime that invites the exception. In light of affirma-
tions that “the area of Manhattan . . . in particular the portion of
Washington Heights nearest to the George Washington Bridge, is known
amongst law enforcement officers as a significant center of narcotics traf-
ficking,”129 Judge Baer accepted the circumscription of the area—or its
exception from the New York City of travelers and tourists, whose goings
and comings should prompt no suspicion. This spatial demarcation factor,
among others, shapes the significance of the facts, leading Judge Baer to
reverse his previous decision.
The doctrinal deference to suspicion in the “more likely than not” stan-
dard and the structural incorporation of drug crimes in minority neigh-
borhoods as a site of exception challenge Judge Baer’s ability to resist a
master narrative of exclusion.130 In addition, Bayless II struggles to delin-
eate the places of narrative and myth. Though Judge Baer ultimately dis-
avows the dicta in Bayless I, the inclusion of yet another quotation (this
125. Id. at 216. In Bayless I, Judge Baer makes plain that he is persuaded by the credi-
bility of the defendant—in light of the fact, among others, that she incriminated her own
son, Bayless I, 913 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), and cites the absence of the testifying
officer’s partner’s testimony as a basis for doubt. Id. at 239.
126. Bayless II, 921 F. Supp. at 217.
127. Id. at 215.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 215 n.4.
130. Id. at 213.
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time, of Thurgood Marshall) illustrates the roles of narrative in shaping
the bounds of law and the struggle of the judge to police the framework
from within the “city” or the place of the law.
In a final coda to Bayless II, labelled “Additional Thoughts,” the deci-
sion makes a special space for narrative to obliquely address the issue of
bounding legal authority.131 Judge Baer notes the distinction between a
holding (“a proposition of law”) and dicta (“additional material which is
included in most opinions but which does not relate directly to the hold-
ing”).132 He explicitly abandons what he called “the hyperbole (dicta) in
[his] initial decision,” but does so ambivalently in light of the special
space accorded this discussion.133 Echoing the title of the section, Judge
Baer’s definition of dicta acknowledges that the “additional material . . .
may color the holding of an opinion, [but] it by no means constitutes a
legal or factual conclusion.”134 In this space outside, but related to, the
legal holding, Judge Baer expresses contrition for dicta in Bayless I that
unfortunately not only obscured the true focus of the analysis, but regret-
fully may have demeaned the law-abiding men and women who make
Washington Heights their home and the vast majority of the dedicated
men and women in blue who patrol the streets of our great city.135
Acknowledging the seeming porousness of the distinction between rea-
sonable suspicion and an unlawful stop, Judge Baer notes that “the Gov-
ernment’s success did not come easily. The facts of this case have
consistently danced the fine line between a valid search and seizure so
essential to the Government’s criminal justice initiative and a trespass on
citizens’ rights.”136
In this bracketed space of dicta related to legal authority but in its mar-
gin, Judge Baer rethinks his characterization of the officers. However, the
dicta in Bayless II also veers back to the macro socio-legal problem that
this case engages: “While it is clear that the Fourth Amendment operates
to protect all members of our society from unreasonable searches and
seizures, it is equally as unclear whether this protection exists to its fullest
extent for people of color generally, and in inner-city neighborhoods in
particular.”137 Identifying the problem of a space of exception, Bayless II
concludes by quoting Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissenting opinion in
United States v. Sokolow, which rejects stereotypes as the basis for rea-
sonable suspicion.138 Judge Baer reiterates Justice Marshall’s warning:
“Because the strongest advocates of Fourth Amendment rights are fre-
quently criminals, it is easy to forget that our interpretations . . . apply to







138. See 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the innocent and the guilty alike.”139
The struggle of the judge to manage the space of law in light of the
persuasive and pervasive power of narrative thus becomes clear. In its
effort to pursue the goals of law that includes all citizens in the constitu-
tional right to be free from warrantless searches, Bayless II takes pains to
contain the space of political critique. Judge Baer does so in a way that at
first glance seems to demonstrate the fixed parameters of the law. How-
ever, viewed in light of Bayless I and the political and historical reality,
his efforts prove less persuasive. This reality includes the macro-structural
creation of spaces of exception in low income and minority communi-
ties140 as well as the political pushback that threatens to oust Judge Baer
from his own position within the legal framework.141
These decisions call attention to the dynamic by which narrative itself
informs and challenges the city’s limits as a space of law on the ground
and conceptually. It highlights the difficulties facing the judge as gate-
keeper—even as he or she attempts to serve the goals of the law.
Substantively, Judge Baer’s decisions point to the interest in preserving
a presumption of innocence, even as he struggles to find the space for this
counter narrative perhaps, though not unequivocally, beyond the bounds
of the law. This dynamic illuminates the significance of counter narrative
and highlights the way Judge Sotomayor’s evocations of history in her
dissenting opinion in Strieff makes legal space for Black Lives Matter.
IV. “DO NOT BE SOOTHED”: THE POET SURVEYS THE CITY
In the context of the counter narrative Black Lives Matter offers,142 the
power of the storyteller to negotiate the boundaries of the law, if incre-
mentally, has become manifest in the headline-grabbing dissent penned
by Justice Sotomayor in Utah v. Strieff.143 This case involved an unlawful
stop of Edward Strieff upon leaving a house in which drug dealing was
suspected.144 After learning of an outstanding traffic warrant and initiat-
ing a search, the police found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia
on Strieff, which the Supreme Court held to be admissible into evi-
139. Bayless II, 921 F. Supp. at 217 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)). Notably in the Sokolow dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall expressed con-
cern about the reliance of law enforcement agents on profiling, which serves as an “impre-
cise stereotype” that threatens to “dull the officer’s ability and determination to make
sensitive and fact-specific inferences.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12, 13 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
140. The “war on drugs”—and the attendant criminalization of certain forms of drug
use and distribution—is just one element in a broader socio-legal framework that has been
charged with pushing communities to the margins. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Rep-
arations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/
the-case-for-reparations/361631; see also FORMAN, supra note 110.
141. See Van Natta, Federal Judge Reverses Decision, supra note 71 (citing questions
about the role of political pressure on the judge’s decision).
142. Barthes offers political speech, or speech that aims to transform reality—such as
revolutionary language—as the counterpoint to myth. BARTHES, supra note 73, at 259.
143. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2060 (majority opinion).
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dence.145 The exclusionary rule—the exclusion of evidence uncovered
through unconstitutional police conduct—serves as the primary judicial
means to deter Fourth Amendment violations. It involves a cost-benefit
analysis in which the rule does “not apply when the costs of exclusion
outweigh its deterrent benefits.”146
In light of this balance, the Court held applicable in this case an excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule—the attenuation doctrine.147 The majority
of the Court considered the discovery of an intervening warrant and a
search pursuant to the arrest as sufficiently attenuating the connection
between the unlawful police stop and discovery.148 As a result, the Court
found the evidence not subject to the exclusionary rule.149
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor rejects the Court’s view of
the limited protection the Fourth Amendment affords individuals. In her
view, the Fourth Amendment should prohibit an unlawful stop, warrant
check, and subsequent search.150 Her dissenting opinion characterizes the
warrant search as “part and parcel” of the illegal search in light of the
prevalence of outstanding warrants and thus the predictability of the of-
ficer uncovering one.151
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion seized attention for articulating
the perspective of Black Lives Matter152 and garnered criticism for its
failure to confront the extent of the estrangement of black communi-
ties.153 This article identifies another important feature—the significance
of its implicit acknowledgment of the impact of necropower. A counter
narrative mobilizing empathy enables the recognition of the space of ex-
ception to legal norms that exists within the metaphorical city—the space
of law—as well as in the actual streets. By inviting the metaphorical poet
145. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2059 (majority opinion).
147. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 2063 (majority opinion).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was joined in
part by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who also joined a dissenting opinion penned by Jus-
tice Elena Kagan. Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion foregrounds the issue of balancing
between the “competing considerations” of deterrence of unlawful police conduct and the
costs of suppression of evidence. Id. at 2071 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan’s dissent-
ing opinion takes up the three factors guiding “attenuation doctrine” analysis, but disputes
the majority’s application to the facts. Id. at 2072–73 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
152. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Police May Use Evidence Found After Ille-
gal Stops, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/us/supreme-
court-says-police-may-use-evidence-found-after-illegal-stops.html (reporting on an assess-
ment by law professor Justin Driver that Justice Sotomayor’s Strieff dissent is “the strong-
est indication we have yet that the Black Lives Matter movement has made a difference at
the Supreme Court—at least with one justice”); see also Adam Liptak, In Dissents, Sonia
Sotomayor Takes on the Criminal Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/us/politics/in-dissents-sonia-sotomayor-takes-on-the-criminal-jus
tice-system.html.
153. See Bell, supra note 29, at 2066. Identifying the defendant’s race, Justice
Sotomayor asserts, “The white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be
violated in this manner.” Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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into the city, Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion establishes the au-
thority of the narrative of the Movement for Black Lives. She does so in
part through rhetorical echoes of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s empathy-de-
manding articulation of resistance, his Letter from Birmingham Jail, dis-
cussed in the section below.
Thus, in the liminal space of dissent, the opinion demands empathy. It
thereby makes room for an empathetic narrative to shape doctrine be-
yond the bounds of the specific evidentiary issue in Strieff. Echoing ear-
lier expressions of resistance to a dominant narrative, Justice Sotomayor’s
dissenting opinion demonstrates how narrative, counter narrative, and
rhetoric play roles in shaping the bounds of the legal space on the ground,
with respect to its citizens, and in the discourse of law. Through empathy,
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent demonstrates the mobilization of narrative to
serve the goals of law.
Before analyzing the operation of rhetoric and narrative in Justice
Sotomayor’s resonant dissenting opinion and the way it incorporates
King’s voice and others, this article discusses the way in which Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s now canonical letter challenges the parameters of law
and demands social inclusion through the mobilization of empathy.
A. “OUTSIDERS COMING IN” AND THE SPACE OF EMPATHY IN
LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL
Now integrated into the canon of great American writing and recog-
nized as a model for legal argument,154 Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter
from Birmingham Jail155 was prompted by his arrest and imprisonment
for participating in a civil rights march in Birmingham, Alabama, in April
1963.156 The Letter responded to a published letter penned by eight Ala-
bama clergymen criticizing the civil rights demonstrations for being “un-
wise and untimely.”157 The Letter implicitly identified the necropolitical
impact of legal actors. In doing so, it creates conceptual space to include
those excluded from the protections of the law by rebutting and refram-
ing categories and through the mobilization of empathy.
Taking up first the critique of the protesters as “outsiders coming in,”
King’s Letter follows a rhetorical pattern that counters the claim on its
own terms, but also redefines the categories so as to reposition himself as
an insider.158 Thus, King notes his role as president of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), with an affiliate in Birming-
ham, and the invitation it extended to King and his staff to “engage in a
154. See, e.g., Mark DeForrest, Introducing Persuasive Legal Argument via The Letter
from a Birmingham City Jail, 15 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 109, 110–11
(2009).
155. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), reprinted in
26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 835 (1993).
156. Haig Bosmajian, The Letter from Birmingham Jail, in MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.:
A PROFILE 128, 128 (C. Eric Lincoln ed., 1984).
157. King, supra note 155, at 835.
158. Id.
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nonviolent direct-action program if . . . deemed necessary.”159
Yet, in an additional rhetorical move, which the Letter repeatedly un-
dertakes, King challenges the category that bounds him out. In this case,
he argues that he is in Birmingham because of the presence of injustice,
which “compel[s]” his “carry[ing] the gospel of freedom beyond [his]
hometown.”160 Likening himself to the Apostle Paul and noting the “in-
terrelatedness of all communities and states,” he both places himself
within the polity and reconfigures its boundaries: “caught in an ines-
capable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny . . . Any-
one who lives inside the United States can never be considered an
outsider anywhere within its bounds.”161 Through protest and the letter’s
counter argument, King thereby acknowledges the exclusion of certain
communities from the space of law and reimagines the category to in-
clude them.
Along similar lines, King’s Letter follows this pattern, countering the
clergymen’s concerns about the movement’s “willingness to break laws”
and their charges of untimeliness and extremism.162 For each, King pro-
vides counter evidence. For example, King points to SCLC’s “diligen[ce
in] urg[ing] people to obey the Supreme Court’s decision of 1954 outlaw-
ing segregation in schools” to rebut charges of insensitivity to law, before
challenging the category as a whole (“an unjust law is no law”).163 King
thereby claims access to a shared space. He posits new aspirational
boundaries to re-inscribe the group within the parameters of American
law. He repeats this move, countering charges of extremism (citing nonvi-
olent approach) only to embrace the role of “extremist for love” modeled
by Jesus, Amos, Paul, Martin Luther, John Bunyan, Abraham Lincoln,
and Thomas Jefferson.164 In this way, the Letter reconceives of a space of
inclusion in which the resistance to socio-legal structures mobilize a
shared perspective.
Yet in addition to countering and redefining the terms of exclusion, the
Letter mobilizes a demand for empathy, voicing the experiences of those
circumscribed by segregation and denied rights under law. King makes a
rhetorical move that resonates in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. He coun-
ters the charge of untimeliness through a direct address of the reader—
the same move implicit in Black Lives Matter and echoed by Justice
159. Id. at 835–36.
160. Id. at 836.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 840.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 843–45 (“Was not Jesus an extremist for love . . . Was not Amos an extremist
for justice . . . Was not Paul an extremist for the Christian gospel . . . Was not Martin
Luther an extremist . . . And Abraham Lincoln: ‘This nation cannot survive half slave and
half free.’ And Thomas Jefferson: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal . . . .’ So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of
extremists we will be. Will we be extremists for hate or for love? Will we be extremists for
the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice?”) (citations omitted).
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Sotomayor.165 Responding to the clergymen’s urging to “wait” for the
proper time, the Letter follows the pattern, rebutting the claim on its own
terms.166 It also then reframes the question, in this case mobilizing a
counter narrative to demand empathy and create a space of recognition
of the excluded community.
The Letter speculates, “Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt
the stinging darts of segregation to say, ‘Wait.’”167 To remedy this, the
Letter offers the perspective of the excluded group and invites the reader
to imagine herself in this place. By using the direct address “you,” the
Letter demands empathy. In this way, it draws in the reader so as to es-
tablish the rightful place of law:
But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fa-
thers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you
have seen hate-filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your black
brothers and sisters; when you see the vast majority of your twenty
million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in
the midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue
twisted and your speech stammering as you seek to explain to your
six-year-old daughter why she can’t go to the public amusement park
that has just been advertised on television, and see tears welling up
in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is closed to colored chil-
dren, and see ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in her
little mental sky, and see her beginning to distort her personality by
developing an unconscious bitterness toward white people; when you
have to concoct an answer for a five-year-old son who is asking:
“Daddy, why do white people treat colored people so mean?” . . .
when you are forever fighting a degenerating sense of ‘nobodiness’—
then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait.168
Thus, drawing on the format of poetry,169 a long paragraph recounts
the harms of exclusion from civil society from the perspective of those
suffering exclusion. It thereby demands recognition and thus empathy
from King’s critics. Through the contingent grammatical structure, the
Letter emphasizes how this experience remains outside the white real-
ity.170 Through the mobilization of counter narrative, King thereby cre-
ates a space for “legitimate and unavoidable impatience”171 that must be
seen and acknowledged if not shared by the reader.
The Letter and the voice of King, if not his ultimate agenda, have come
to be included in the space of American identity and history, even if the
165. See Yancy & Butler, supra note 7 (George Yancy suggesting that “‘Black Lives
Matter’ says something like: ‘You—white police officers—recognize my/our humanity!’”)
166. King, supra note 155, at 839 (“We have waited for more than 340 years for our
constitutional and God-given rights”).
167. Id. (citation omitted).
168. Id.
169. Among other literary devices, King draws on anaphora in the repetition of the
phrase “when you” building toward the turn, or volta, marked by “—then . . . .” Id.
170. I thank Beth Johnston for this insight.
171. Id. at 840.
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charges of necropower still ring true. An examination of Justice
Sotomayor’s intervention to call attention to the ongoing creation of
spaces of exclusion from the presumptions of law reveals the incorpora-
tion of the civil rights perspective through the rhetorical allusion to
King’s Letter. It also shows how Justice Sotomayor mobilizes King’s argu-
mentative strategy to challenge not only the boundaries of the law but its
defining categories. In this way, though penning a dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Sotomayor’s embrace of the perspective and rhetorical underpin-
nings of Black Lives Matter might prove more successful than the efforts
of Judge Baer in creating a space of recognition in and beyond the law.
At the very least, they reflect the struggles of the judge to mediate the
limits of the law as the poet in the city.
B. STRIEFF AND THE STATE OF EXCEPTION
TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Of late, the impact of a counter narrative to the presumption that law
enforcement operates untainted by racial or economic-status biases has
been noticeable in judicial decisions. Drawing on an analogy between the
poet’s relation to the city to the place of literature in the “sphere of law,”
Yoshino evaluates Plato’s casting out of the poet from the city as a “figure
of misrule.”172 He identifies the potential for narrative to “transform the
preexisting landscape” and thereby threaten or aid the legal process.173
As the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor indicates, counter narra-
tive may impact doctrinal assessment (here, the “attenuation doctrine”
allowing unlawfully obtained evidence to be excepted from the exclusion-
ary rule). In addition, however, narrative does something more compli-
cated than serve the goals of the law or remain extra-legal if it does
not.174 As this discussion demonstrates, narrative challenges the parame-
ters of what constitutes legal authority.
Making headlines,175 Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Utah v.
Strieff176 rejects the Court’s position that discovery of a preexisting war-
rant for an individual’s arrest attenuated the connection between a police
172. Yoshino, supra note 2, at 1841–42.
173. Id. at 1891.
174. Cf. id. at 1841–42 (invoking the Platonic model in which the boundaries of the city
are fixed, if at times permeable to narrative).
175. See, e.g., Monica Akhtar, Here’s What Justice Sotomayor Said in Her Fiery Dissent,
WASH. POST (June 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/heres-what-
justice-sotomayor-said-in-her-fiery-dissent/2016/06/20/3b83893e-3719-11e6-af02-1df55f0c77
ff_video.html (displaying quotes set to synthesized music); Matt Ford, Justice Sotomayor’s
Ringing Dissent, ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2016/06/utah-streiff-sotomayor/487922/; Tal Kopan, Sotomayor in Fiery Dissent: Illegal
Stops ‘Corrode All Our Civil Liberties’, CNN (June 21, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/
06/20/politics/sotomayor-supreme-court-dissent-utah-strieff/index.html; Liptak, Police May
Use Evidence, supra note 152 (reporting on assessment by law Professor Justin Driver, that
Justice Sotomayor’s Strieff dissent is “the strongest indication we have yet that the Black
Lives Matter movement has made a difference at the Supreme Court—at least with one
justice”); see also Liptak, In Dissents, supra note 152.
176. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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stop lacking reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and the discovery of evidence, thereby making the evidence admissible in
court.177 Justice Clarence Thomas’s majority opinion foregrounds the
costs of excluding evidence in relation to the benefits of deterrence.178
Weighing the temporal proximity of the search to the unlawful stop, the
presence of intervening factors (the existence of a warrant), and the lack
of flagrant misconduct, the majority of the Court held that the interven-
ing warrant and “at most negligent” actions of the police officer rendered
the evidence admissible.179
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion180 reframes the legal question
of the admissibility of unlawfully discovered evidence. It does so by mo-
bilizing counter narrative in pointed ways. The opinion calls attention to
the creation of a space in which the subject is, as a functional matter,
presumed guilty. In doing so, it seeks to reestablish the primacy of pre-
sumed innocence that underpins the constitutional right to be free of un-
lawful search and seizure.
Specifically, Justice Sotomayor underscores the role of the exclusionary
rule as a tool to protect against “lawless invasions” of constitutional
rights.181 Ultimately, the opinion counters the majority opinion’s analysis
of the costs of exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence versus the bene-
fits of deterrence of unlawful police conduct.182 In this way, the counter
narrative serves not only as a rhetorical persuasive tool underpinning the
legal argument but as a way to actualize the harm that must be consid-
ered in the weighing of the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule.
Invoking the rhetorical approach of King’s Letter, Justice Sotomayor
imposes a perspectival shift and demands a conceptual one. Her dissent-
ing opinion begins with a warning that addresses the reader directly:
Do not be soothed by the opinion’s technical language: This case al-
lows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification,
and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing
nothing wrong. If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot
to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into
177. Id. at 2064.
178. Id. at 2059 (majority opinion).
179. Id. at 2062–63.
180. Dissents serve as potent sources for emerging counter narratives, as suggested by
now “canonical” cases that achieved this status by virtue of what became persuasive dis-
senting opinions. See Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48
DUKE L.J. 243, 244–45 (1998).
181. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 13 (1968)).
182. Justice Thomas notes the “significant costs” of the exclusionary rule that have led
the Court to apply it only “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social
costs.” See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061 (majority opinion) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). Writing for the majority in Hudson, Justice Scalia reestablished the
Court’s position, tracing back to United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), of resisting the
suppression of evidence. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591. The Court established in Hudson
that a violation of the requirement that the police “knock-and-announce” their presence
before entering a home does not mandate suppression of evidence obtained in circum-
stances in which the police had already procured a search warrant. Id. at 589–90.
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evidence anything he happens to find by searching you after arrest-
ing you on the warrant.183
This move also echoes the implications of the direct address canonized
by King in his Letter.184 In this way, it gives voice to the claims of the civil
rights movement and the history of exclusion underscored by the pre-
sumption of guilt in this particular space. Foregrounding a presumptively
innocent citizen (rather than red-handed defendant) and positioning the
reader in this role, the opinion also challenges the majority’s characteriza-
tion of its holding, which purports to apply rather than revise existing
doctrine.185 The cautionary narrative stance elicits empathy and perhaps
fear. It thereby makes space for a counter narrative that becomes even
more explicit in the last part of the opinion. Thus, the rhetorical stance of
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion makes room for the legal argu-
ment and calls attention to the threat to the goals of the law.186
Through counter narrative, the opinion calls attention to the creation
of a space of exclusion that positions the subject as an enemy, or at the
very least, renders her outside the boundaries of legal protection. The
majority opinion’s narrative begins from a vantage point of suspicion if
not presumed guilt (“[t]his case began with an anonymous tip”).187 In
contrast, the counter narrative mobilizes empathy by focusing on the de-
fendant: minutes after Edward Strieff walked out of a South Salt Lake
City home, an officer stopped him, questioned him, and took his identifi-
cation to run it through a police database.188
As Justice Sotomayor’s telling makes plain, the space the defendant
inhabits marks him: “The officer did not suspect Strieff had done any-
thing wrong. Strieff just happened to be the first person to leave a house
that the officer thought might contain ‘drug activity,’” making the stop
illegal.189 Identifying the police officer’s warrant check as “part and par-
cel of the officer’s illegal ‘expedition for evidence,’” the opinion points to
the “over 180,000 misdemeanor warrants” listed in the Utah database and
the “‘backlog of outstanding warrants’ so large that [Salt Lake County]
faced the ‘potential for civil liability.’”190 In this way it rebuts the major-
183. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
184. For a criticism of this move as universalizing police proximity and threat to ob-
scure the estrangement of particular communities, see Bell, supra note 29, at 2057–58.
185. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
186. Justice Sotomayor critiques what she views as a misapplication of precedent by the
majority. “Wong Sun explains why Strieff’s drugs must be excluded.” Id. at 2066 (citing
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
187. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059 (majority opinion).
188. Id. at 2064–65 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Social psychologists have demonstrated
that the framing of stories and the way in which facts and events are revealed impact our
understanding of causation and responsibility impact the way we make attributions of cau-
sation, responsibility, and blame. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values,
and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984); see also Adam Benforado, Frames of
Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1353–54 (2010) (applying this insight to
visual frames and camera angles that implicate certain perspectives).
189. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2066.
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ity’s characterization of the officer’s discovery of the warrant as “some
intervening surprise that he could not have anticipated.”191
Positioned as a foreseeable phenomenon rather than an “intervening
circumstance” justifying inclusion under the law,192 the warrant resonates
beyond the singular encounter as a structural issue of legal significance.
Justice Sotomayor refuses to accept the Court’s characterization of the
event as “isolated.” The dissenting opinion makes plain the incorporation
of a space of exception in the legal and physical landscape in which sub-
jects may already be marked guilty.193 Citing data revealing the “surpris-
ingly common” (indeed “staggering”) prevalence of “[o]utstanding
warrants”—”the vast majority of which appear to be for minor of-
fenses”—the opinion brings to light the operation of necropower “across
the country.”194 The opinion calls attention to “astounding numbers of
warrants [that] can be used by police to stop people without cause”195
and the practice of searching for warrants as part of “institutionalized
training procedures.”196 In doing so, it depicts a space of exception in
which subjects come to be presumed guilty within the structures of the
city and the law.
Manifesting the impact of the Court’s holding on people’s lived experi-
ence, Justice Sotomayor’s counter narrative challenges the doctrinal cost-
benefit analysis of the exclusionary rule underpinning the majority opin-
ion. The counter narrative that exposes the costs and the presumed guilt
of the subject bolsters Justice Sotomayor’s claim that the majority opin-
ion “misses the point” when it characterizes the warrant check in this case
as a “‘negligibly burdensome precautio[n]’ taken for the officer’s
‘safety.’”197 Instead, the dissenting opinion reestablishes the context that
should frame police behavior. It reminds the reader of the uncontested
fact that “the officer stopped Strieff without suspecting him of commit-
ting any crime.”198 Together, the admonishment, the particular narrative
starting point, and the implication of the reader through direct address
claim a substantively significant space for the defendant in a position of
unlawfully challenged innocence.
C. INSINUATING THE POET INTO THE CITY LIMITS
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion reflects a sensitivity to the
judge’s involvement in the policing of the bounds of the law, including
through the mobilization of narrative. The opinion identifies the role of
the exclusionary rule in disincentivizing lawless searches by police and in
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. In an analogue to the necropolitical framework, these people exist as so-called
dead men walking.
194. See id. at 2068.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2069.
197. Id. at 2067 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015)).
198. Id.
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keeping courts “from being ‘made party to lawless invasions of the consti-
tutional rights of citizens.’”199 Justice Sotomayor brackets the final sec-
tion, asserting that she writes “only for [her]self . . . drawing on
professional experiences.”200 Nonetheless, this section also substantively
counters the majority’s position that the costs of exclusion outweigh the
benefits in this case.201 It does so—in echoes of Judge Baer and of King—
through the invocation of an array of literature traditionally deemed
outside the official canon of legal authority—from W.E.B. Du Bois’ turn
of the century ground-breaking sociological essays in The Souls of Black
Folk, to James Baldwin’s essays on race, to Michelle Alexander’s socio-
historical study, The New Jim Crow.202 In addition, its rhetorical plea for
empathy seeks to create a space for the excluded subject through
recognition.
In the liminal space of the dissenting opinion, and armed with the
counterpoint to myth of the momentum and literature of the Movement
for Black Lives and its antecedents, Justice Sotomayor does not apologize
for her mobilization of dicta. Instead, she grants authority to cultural
forms ostensibly outside the law. The opinion highlights the socio-legal
context that impacts the presumed balance of interests in the law. It sub-
tly mobilizes the reframing of categories, such as the presumptive legal
legitimacy of traffic warrants, echoing the rhetorical move of King’s Let-
ter. It thereby invites a rethinking of the “substantial social costs” impli-
cated in the application of the exclusionary rule.203
Most powerfully perhaps, the final part of the dissent echoes King’s
insistence on making room for a counter narrative voice and mobilizing
empathy as a means of recognition:
This Court has allowed an officer to stop you for whatever reason he
wants . . . The indignity of the stop is not limited to an officer telling
you that you look like a criminal. The officer may next ask for your
“consent” to inspect your bag or purse without telling you that you
can decline. Regardless of your answer, he may order you to stand
helpless, perhaps facing a wall with [your] hands raised. If the officer
thinks you might be dangerous, he may then “frisk” you for weapons
. . . . Even if you are innocent, you will now join the 65 million Amer-
icans with an arrest record and experience the “civil death” of dis-
crimination by employers, landlords, and whoever else conducts a
background check.”204
At the risk of universalizing the harm, the opinion also follows King’s
model by insisting on the cost as one borne within the bounds of the
metaphorical city, or shared collective space of law. By recognizing the
structural circumscription of the protections of law, the opinion ulti-
199. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2065 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968)).
200. Id. at 2070.
201. See id. at 2061 (majority opinion).
202. Id. at 2069–70 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 2061 (majority opinion).
204. Id. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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mately insists on internalizing this harm. In doing so, it rejects the legiti-
macy of this application of law and tries to reclaim the space for those
excluded. As the opinion concludes:
By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double consciousness,
this case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an
officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body
is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights.
It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of
a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.205
Straddling a liminal space of the dissenting opinion in the articulation of
the law, Justice Sotomayor calls on the voice of the poet—both in citing
literature as authority and through rhetorical allusion—attempting to
shape the space of legal protection. In the case of Strieff, the counter
narrative fails to impact the doctrine directly.
Still, it might prove more successful in affecting the specific boundaries
of the space of law than the attempts by Judge Baer. Notably, and as an
indication of the power of narrative to influence doctrine, the awareness
of the necropolitical framework invoked in Strieff has shaped the judge-
ment of some courts considering other legal questions. Thus, in a revisit-
ing of the conundrum faced by Judge Baer, for example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected flight from police on its
own as a probative indication of guilt or state of mind to engender rea-
sonable suspicion, citing reports on systemic bias in police stops.206
Acknowledging the operation of necropower within the law, the court
asserted in Massachusetts v. Warren:
[W]here the suspect is a black male stopped by the police on the
streets of Boston, the analysis of flight as a factor in the reasonable
suspicion calculus cannot be divorced from the findings in a recent
Boston Police Department . . . report documenting a pattern of racial
profiling of black males in the city of Boston.207
Suppressing evidence of unlawful firearm possession in this case because
of lack of reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, the court as-
serted the need to consider the context established by the report in
“weighing flight as a factor” in assessing reasonable suspicion.208 Moreo-
ver, it noted the “factual irony” of considering evasion of the police as a
factor in determining reasonable suspicion in light of the freedom of citi-
zens to choose not to speak to an officer absent reasonable suspicion.209
As such, the opinion mobilizes Justice Sotomayor’s counter narrative of
presumptive innocence, recognizing the implicit narrative of presumed
205. Id. at 2071.
206. Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016); see also Common-
wealth v. Meneus, 66 N.E.3d 1019, 1024 (Mass. 2017) (holding a suspect’s backing away
from police to avoid an unconsented-to patfrisk permitted no inference of criminal activity
in support of reasonable suspicion).
207. Warren, 58 N.E.3d at 342.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 341.
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guilt as suggested by the reframing of the experiences of people of color
in the notion of the “crime” of “walking while black.”210 In this way, the
counter narrative challenge to the necropolitical structure can be seen to
impact the very bounds of the law.
V. CONCLUSION
As the above discussion demonstrates, the policing of the literal space
and disciplinary boundaries of law cannot be fully cordoned off from the
socio-political framework. Society is, in turn, shaped by the narratives
and myths that inform understandings of our world. This complicates the
job of the judge who must also police the bounds of narratives in and
impacting the law. Yet, the mandate to counter myth echoed by Judge
Baer remains more relevant than ever. It can be taken up in doctrine that
recognizes the significance of inclusion in the space of the law through a
broadly imposed presumption of innocence. In light of the goals of the
law, not least the right of people to be “secure in their persons,” the
counter narrative of the Movement for Black Lives and its historical pre-
cursors point to the need to secure doctrinally and structurally the pre-
sumption of innocence even before a subject becomes a defendant in a
courtroom. Currently, the doctrinal operation of reasonable doubt, for
example, happens only within the courtroom. The Black Lives Matter
counter narrative suggests the legal significance of policing narratives to
establish an inclusive space of presumed innocence on the streets as well
as at the gates of the courtroom. More broadly, it demonstrates the po-
tential of narrative to shape parameters of law.
210. I use the word “crime” here to point to the social implications and “law in action”
rather than to the “law on the books.” See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 12–15 (1910). The contextualization of the law by Justice
Sotomayor and others, however, suggests the interdependence of these concepts.
